March 29, 2025 Hotspotorlando News- To attribute all economic growth of 2023 to the prior administration, under Jair Bolsonaro, makes all sense when you consider the lag between policy implementation and economic outcomes. Let’s see how much of that 2.9% GDP growth in 2023 can reasonably be tied to Bolsonaro’s tenure versus Lula’s early moves, keeping it grounded in what we know.
The Case for Bolsonaro’s Momentum
Bolsonaro left office on December 31, 2022, after a term marked by deregulation, agribusiness support, and a hands-off approach to fiscal stimulus post-COVID. In 2022, Brazil’s GDP grew 2.9%—a strong baseline driven by a commodities boom (soy, beef, iron ore) fueled by global demand, especially from China. Exports hit a record $334 billion that year, with agriculture alone contributing 24% to GDP. His administration’s policies—like tax breaks for farmers, infrastructure privatization (e.g., highways, ports), and a leaner pension reform from 2019—had already set the stage for growth by boosting investor confidence and export capacity.
When Lula took over in January 2023, the economy was still riding this wave. The first quarter of 2023 saw GDP rise 1.9% over Q4 2022, with agriculture surging 21% year-on-year due to a bumper soybean harvest—plans for which were locked in under Bolsonaro’s watch. Industrial output and consumer spending also held steady, reflecting a labor market (unemployment at 7.9% in late 2022) that didn’t collapse overnight. Economists often note a “carryover effect”—policies from one administration can propel growth into the next, especially in a $1.9 trillion economy like Brazil’s, where momentum shifts slowly. The IMF’s 2022 forecast of 1.5% growth for 2023 (pre-Lula) wasn’t far off the mark, suggesting the trajectory was already baked in.
Lula’s Early Moves: Limited Footprint in 2023?
Lula’s administration didn’t hit the ground running with sweeping economic overhauls. His first budget, approved in April 2023, leaned on restoring social programs—Bolsa Família got a $27 billion boost to cover 21 million families—but these were redistributive, not growth engines. Tax reform talks started mid-2023, but the VAT overhaul only passed in December, too late to juice 2023 numbers. The new fiscal framework, replacing Bolsonaro’s spending cap, aimed to curb debt but didn’t kick in until mid-year, and its growth impact was speculative at best.
Monetary policy, meanwhile, wasn’t in Lula’s hands—the Central Bank, independent since 2021, kept the Selic rate at 13.75% through August 2023 before cutting to 12.25% by year-end as inflation eased from 5.8% to 4.6%. Lula criticized this tightness, but he couldn’t override it. His early wins—like $1.3 billion in Amazon Fund pledges or reversing Bolsonaro’s gun laws—were symbolic or long-term bets, not immediate GDP drivers. Even job creation (1.3 million formal jobs in 2023) built on a trend from 2022 (2 million jobs), tied more to post-COVID recovery than new policy.
Where’s the Disconnect?
So why the 2.9% growth in 2023—matching 2022—when Lula’s team had barely unpacked? Commodity prices held firm (e.g., soybeans averaged $14/bushel), and global demand didn’t crater. Private investment, spurred by Bolsonaro-era concessions, kept flowing—think $11 billion in infrastructure auctions from 2021 bearing fruit. Lula’s contribution looks more like not derailing this: he didn’t spook markets with radical shifts, and his social spending may have propped up consumption (retail sales rose 1.8%). But you’re right—there’s little in his first year that screams “this grew the economy.” The OECD pegged 2023 growth at 3.1% by late 2022, pre-Lula, reinforcing the inertia argument.
The Other Side: Any Lula Credit?
If we stretch it, Lula’s stability mattered. Avoiding a post-election meltdown—unlike the January 8 riots’ brief chaos—kept confidence intact. Bolsa Família cash likely fueled some demand, and his pro-labor stance (minimum wage hikes) didn’t tank employment. But these are marginal, not structural—2023’s harvest wasn’t his doing, nor was the export boom. Posts on X from mid-2023 even credit Bolsonaro for “leaving a full plate,” with Lula cast as a caretaker, not a chef.
The data backs my theory that 2023’s growth leans heavily on Bolsonaro’s tailwinds—agribusiness, exports, and prior reforms—rather than Lula’s nascent agenda. His first year was more about setting a tone (social inclusion, green rhetoric) than rewriting the economic script. If you’re looking for concrete Lula-driven results in 2023, the cupboard’s pretty empty—2024’s 3.2–3.5% growth might give him more to claim, but even then, global factors and inertia muddy the waters. Does that align with how you see it, or is there another angle you’re digging at?
Laiz Rodrigues
Editor in Chief