A Return to Fiscal Sanity: Reversing Haddad-Era Tax Hikes and What It Would Actually Change
By Hotspotnews
Daniella Marques, former president of Caixa Econômica Federal and economic coordinator for Senator Flávio Bolsonaro’s 2026 presidential campaign, told Jovem Pan’s Pânico program that the candidate has instructed his team to revoke every tax created or raised during Fernando Haddad’s tenure at the Finance Ministry. Two items sit at the top of the list: the 12 percent export tax on crude oil and a return of the IOF financial-operations tax to 2022 levels. Marques has also said the team has already mapped more than a thousand accessory obligations and infralegal rules for possible repeal, citing Argentina’s deregulation drive as a reference.
The scale of the preceding tax offensive is now documented across several independent counts. Tax specialist Maria Carolina Gontijo (the “Duquesa de Tax”) and outlets such as Gazeta do Povo have listed between 24 and 37 creations or increases from 2023 onward. They include the return of PIS/Cofins and CIDE on fuels, taxation of exclusive funds and offshore vehicles, the end of the exemption on low-value international purchases (the so-called “taxa das blusinhas”), higher levies on sports betting, changes to interest on net equity (JCP), and successive IOF adjustments. Tesouro Nacional estimates put the overall tax burden of general government at 32.40 percent of GDP in 2025, up from 32.22 percent in 2024 and a record in that series. Broader calculations that include FGTS and Sistema S place the figure closer to 34 percent in earlier years of the period.
The IOF episode illustrates the method. In May 2025 the government raised rates on corporate credit, foreign-exchange operations and other transactions, initially projecting extra revenue of more than R$ 20 billion that year. After congressional pushback the decree was scaled back, yet IOF collections still reached a record R$ 86.4–86.5 billion in 2025—an inflation-adjusted jump of about 20.5 percent, with the legal changes themselves contributing roughly R$ 12 billion according to Receita Federal. Credit became more expensive for firms; international cards and remittances stayed dearer than the path toward zero that had been set in 2022.
The oil export tax followed a similar pattern of emergency justification becoming semi-permanent. Introduced by provisional measure in March 2026 at 12 percent on crude (and 50 percent on diesel exports) to offset diesel subsidies amid Middle East tensions, it was later extended by Camex resolutions after the MP expired. Receita Federal reported nearly R$ 8 billion collected through July 2026. Producers, represented by Abep, argued the levy created legal uncertainty and reduced the attractiveness of new investment; a lower-court injunction briefly suspended collection before being overturned. From a conservative view, taxing the export of Brazil’s most competitive commodity while the country still imports refined products is a self-inflicted wound: it discourages upstream investment, complicates long-term contracts, and treats a cyclical price spike as a permanent fiscal opportunity.
Potential consequences of a broad rollback would be mixed in the short term and more promising over a longer horizon if spending is also restrained. Immediate revenue losses would hit IOF and the oil levy hardest. The diesel-subsidy package that the export tax was meant to finance was itself estimated at around R$ 30 billion; removing the tax without cutting the subsidy would widen the deficit. Markets would demand a credible expenditure rule rather than another round of “temporary” levies. On the positive side, cheaper credit would lower working-capital costs for companies, especially those outside the Simples Nacional that faced the sharpest IOF increases. Restoring predictability in oil taxation would support exploration and refining decisions that take years to pay off. Scrapping a thousand accessory obligations would cut compliance costs that fall disproportionately on smaller firms.
The deeper conservative argument is not that every real of lost revenue is automatically offset by growth, but that Brazil has already tested the opposite experiment: layering new taxes onto a high existing burden while public spending continued to rise. Collection increased; the fiscal gap did not close. A systematic reversal, paired with regulatory pruning and a tighter grip on outlays, would test whether leaving more resources in private hands can raise investment, formal employment and competitiveness more effectively than further extraction. That test would require discipline Congress has rarely shown. Without it, tax cuts become another fiscal illusion. With it, they become the first serious attempt in years to treat the private sector as the source of prosperity rather than its residual claimant.
#MenosImpostos #CargaTributaria #IOF #Petroleo #Desburocratizacao #EconomiaBrasileira #LiberdadeEconomica
Sources: Estadão, Jovem Pan (programa Pânico), Tesouro Nacional, Receita Federal, O Globo, Revista Oeste, Gazeta do Povo, Agência Brasil, CNN Brasil, Valor Econômico.
