The Chronological Decline of Lula da Silva’s Popularity: Data Reveals a Steady Erosion and Its Ripple Effects on Brazil
By Hotspotnews
As of May 1, 2026, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s third term is entering its final stretch before the October 2026 presidential election. Fresh polling data paints a picture of sustained public disillusionment. According to AtlasIntel’s nationwide survey conducted between April 22 and 27, 2026 (sample of 5,008 respondents, ±1% margin of error), 51.3% of Brazilians rated the Lula government as “bad” or “terrible”—a clear rise from 50% in the firm’s March poll. Positive evaluations (“excellent” or “good”) stood at approximately 42%. This marks the continuation of a multi-year slide that began with strong post-election momentum and has now left Lula’s administration facing historically high rejection levels heading into the vote.
The decline is not sudden but chronological and well-documented across major pollsters including Datafolha, Quaest, and AtlasIntel. It reflects shifting voter perceptions on the economy, fiscal management, and governance scandals despite periods of partial recovery.
Early Term Strength Gives Way to Warning Signs (2023–Early 2024)
Lula entered office in January 2023 riding a wave of optimism after narrowly defeating Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. Initial polls showed approval ratings comfortably above 50%, buoyed by the relaunch of expanded social programs like Bolsa Família and a narrative of economic stabilization after the pandemic. By early 2024, AtlasIntel data still placed personal approval around 51.2% in January, with government evaluations holding steady in the mid-40s to low-50s range.
However, cracks appeared by late 2024. Datafolha’s October 2024 survey already showed “good/excellent” ratings for the government dipping to around 36%, signaling that everyday concerns—rising food prices and persistent inflation—were beginning to outweigh macroeconomic headlines.
The 2025 Collapse: Inflation, Crises, and Record Lows
The sharpest downturn came in early 2025. Datafolha’s February poll delivered a historic blow: only 24% rated the government as “good” or “excellent,” while 41% called it “bad” or “terrible”—the lowest approval figure across Lula’s three terms in office. Disapproval surged amid a cost-of-living squeeze, with household debt and perceptions of declining purchasing power dominating public sentiment.
Subsequent polls showed only modest stabilization rather than rebound. By April 2025, Datafolha recorded a slight uptick to 29% positive and 38% negative. June 2025 figures stalled at roughly 28% approval and 40% disapproval, with the INSS pension system crisis cited as a key drag. Other firms echoed the trend: a Quaest survey in April 2025 showed disapproval climbing to 56% (up from 49% earlier in the year), marking the highest disapproval level of Lula’s modern presidencies at that point.
Partial recovery emerged in late 2025. By November, some polls (including MDA) showed positive ratings climbing back toward 34%. December 2025 Datafolha data indicated “good/excellent” at 32% and “bad/terrible” at 37%, while AtlasIntel figures hovered near 48–49% approval in certain readings. Yet the gains proved fragile, as underlying issues—public debt rising toward 82% of GDP, inflation averaging above target, and criticism of expansionary fiscal policies—continued to fuel skepticism.
2026: Rejection Entrenches as the Election Looms
Entering 2026, the downward trajectory resumed. March polls from Quaest showed 44% approval against 51% disapproval. AtlasIntel’s March 18–23 survey (5,028 respondents) reported 45.9% approval and 53.5% disapproval for the government. By late April 2026, AtlasIntel’s latest data confirmed rejection crossing the 51% threshold once more.
This erosion has translated directly into electoral vulnerability. Runoff simulations in the April 2026 AtlasIntel poll showed Lula statistically tied with right-wing Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (approximately 47.5–47.8% each), a dramatic narrowing from earlier 2025 leads. First-round scenarios also tightened, with opposition candidates consolidating support amid anti-incumbent sentiment.
Consequences: Political, Economic, and Social Repercussions
The data-driven decline carries significant consequences for Brazil.
Politically, Lula’s weakened standing has energized the opposition and complicated the Workers’ Party (PT) path to re-election or succession. With the election less than six months away as of May 2026, the president faces a coin-flip contest that could reshape Congress and the executive branch. High rejection rates limit maneuverability on legislative priorities, potentially stalling reforms or forcing concessions to centrist blocs.
Economically, persistent negative perceptions—despite record-low unemployment and moderate GDP growth earlier in the term—have highlighted a disconnect between official statistics and lived experience. Critics point to rising public debt, fiscal deficits, and slower projected growth (around 1.7–2.0% for 2026) as risks that could intensify if markets lose confidence. Any post-election policy shift, whether under Lula or a successor, will face scrutiny over inflation control, interest rates, and welfare program sustainability.
Socially, the trend has deepened polarization. Scandals reminiscent of past controversies (including banking and pension-related probes) have revived trust issues, while regional divides—stronger support in the Northeast versus growing discontent elsewhere—complicate national cohesion. Voter fatigue with both major poles risks lower turnout or volatile swings in October.
In summary, the chronological polling record—from over 50% approval in early 2023 to consistent 50%+ rejection by April 2026—illustrates a clear erosion of Lula’s political capital. Whether this trajectory leads to a change in leadership or a late recovery remains to be seen, but the data underscores one reality: Brazilian voters are demanding tangible improvements in daily economic security as the 2026 election approaches. The coming months will test whether the administration can reverse the numbers or if the decline becomes a defining legacy of the third term.